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Several recent papers propose competing theoretical explanations for the empirical observation
of an inverted U-shape relationship between enviromental degradation and per-capita income.
We proprose the following test of the theory: calibrate a theoretical model to an already
developed economy using information unrelated to the pollution-income curve. Then simulate
the model starting from a less developed initial condition and compare the predicted pollution-
income relationship with that in the data. Our results are mixed. Some support exists for
the theory that the inverted U-shape results from a corner solution in which less developed
countries do not abate pollution. However, pollution peaks at a level of per capita income
that is much lower than that observed in the U.S. data.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large literature investigates the relationship between environmental degradation and eco-
nomic development. For some pollutants, a number of empirical papers (surveys include
Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Dasputa, Laplante, Wang, and Wheeler, 2002; Dinda, 2004) ﬁnd
evidence of an inverted U-shape: pollution levels rise and then fall as income increases. This
result, popularly known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), has been called into
question by a number of authors (see for example Stern, 2003). These authors show the EKC
result is not robust to various changes in the speciﬁcation of the econometric model. Theoret-
ical models prove the existence of an inverted U-shape pollution-income curve,1 but provide
diﬀering explanations for why the curve occurs. Further, none of these theoretical models
have been tested. Thus no bridge between the theoretical and empirical models exists. This
research uses calibration and simulation to test a growth model with emissions as a factor of
production and environmental quality as a normal good. We also test the idea that the EKC
results from a corner solution in which pollution initially rises with economic development
because no pollution is abated, then falls with development as abatement grows. Although
we sometimes ﬁnd existence of a inverted U-shape, the model predicts for all pollutants that
emissions peak at an income level lower than that in the U.S. data.
The use of calibration to analyze the pollution-income relationship has some advantages.
In particular, calibration requires only data from a developed economy. Thus we avoid missing
or low quality data in developing countries, and do not have to worry about country speciﬁc
eﬀects that might be present if the model were instead estimated using data from a panel of
countries. Further, our calibration exercise is a direct test of a theoretical model, as well as
a test of the idea that the inverted U-shape pollution-income curve arises because countries
initially choose a corner solution with no pollution abatement. Therefore, unlike most empirical
1A large number of theoretical explanations also exist. See Dinda (2004) for a survey.
1papers we directly test a model without using reduced-form equations, which obscure exactly
how and why the inverted U-shape occurs. Also, our results provide some guidance to empirical
research.
Finally, this paper is of general interest in that we provide one of the few rigorous calibra-
tions of a model of growth and the environment. All parameters are calibrated so that the
model matches a variety of long run average features of the data. Thus the theory is consis-
tent with the data in a way that simple numerical examples of theoretical models generally
are not.2 We hence provide a framework for a more rigorous test of theoretical environmental
economics models at the national level. Rather than ask if a numerical example exists that is
analytically consistent with observed facts (for some parameters, the model has an inverted
U-shape), the test we propose asks if a numerical example consistent with a variety of features
of the data generates also the observed fact in question (for a particular set of parameters, the
model has an inverted U-shape that peaks at a point reasonably close to that in the data).
Levinson and Israel (2003) provide the only other existing direct test of the theory. They
utilize the World Values Survey, a poll of about 70,000 residents in 48 countries to ascertain
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a clean environment. Using this largely qualitative
data, Levinson and Israel investigate whether the patterns of willingness to pay conform to
those predicted by John and Pecchenino (1994) and Stokey (1998). They ﬁnd conclusive
evidence that MWTP declines with GDP per capita in rich countries, suggesting that if MWTP
has decreased, the environment must have already improved. They also reveal some semblance
of a peak in MWTP, which implies that a high level of environmental degradation is correlated
with the peak in MWTP (if the environment is bad, people are willing to pay for abatement).
However, their analysis is limited by low-quality survey data.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a list of existing theoretical
2A few theoretical models give numerical examples. For example, Stokey (1998) has a numerical example
in which pollution peaks at about 50% of the steady state capital stock.
2explanations and empirical regularities. Next, we develop our model. We calibrate the model
with U.S. emissions data for ﬁve pollutants. The time series data indicate that emissions of all
pollutants in our sample peak late, after the U.S. was nearly completely developed. We then
computationally examine the shape of the pollution-income curve predicted by the model for
each pollutant. The model predicts an inverted U-shape, but pollution peaks at an income
level lower than that in the U.S. data.
2 Empirical Regularities
We examine the following ambient pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO),
nitrogen oxide (NO2 and NO, collectively NOx), particulates (PM10 and PM2.5, collectively
PM), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and airborne lead. We choose these pollutants based
on the availability of compliance cost data.
The existing empirical literature, which mostly uses data from a panel of countries, show
pollutant-speciﬁc results for a variety of ambient, water and soil pollutants. In general, most
research in this area entails using ﬁxed eﬀects and random eﬀects estimation of quadratic, log-
linear, log-quadratic and/or cubic-polynomial pollution-income relationships. Emissions or
pollutant concentrations (either urban or national) are regressed on GDP per capita as well as
other variables such as time trend, population density and site-related variables. The reduced-
form equation adopted by most of the empirical studies is assumed to capture the structural
model in which income inﬂuences technology, the composition of GDP and environmental
policy, and how changes in these factors in turn aﬀect environmental pressure. An important
issue in the empirical literature is the estimation of the location of the turning point; i.e., the
income level at which emissions peak. Dozens of studies exist; here we present a few standard
ones.3
Grossman and Krueger (1995) estimate a cubic reduced-form relationship between per
3See Dinda (2004) for a survey.
3capita income and various environmental indicators. They use Global Environmental Moni-
toring System (GEMS) pollution concentration data on SO2, heavy particulates, and smoke
(their classiﬁcation for smaller particulates). For most pollutants, they ﬁnd an inverted-U
result, where pollution peaks at a relatively low GDP per capita. Bandopadhyay and Shaﬁk
(1992), using a polynomial with log income and ambient levels of SO2 and suspended par-
ticulate matter (SPM), estimate pollution-income curves with a data set of 149 countries.
They also ﬁnd an inverted-U shape, where pollution peaks at a relatively low GDP per capita.
Selden and Song (1994), employing a quadratic pollution-income relationship, utilize a panel
of national emissions data on SPM, SO2,N O x, and CO. They estimate slightly higher turn-
ing point income levels. Selden and Song (1994) speculate this is because ambient pollution
concentrations are likely to decline before aggregate emissions, due to the population concen-
trations in cities, the ability to install higher smokestacks, etc. Like in Selden and Song (1994),
Panayotou (1993) measures pollutants in terms of emissions per capita on a national basis.
They obtain inverted U-shape results for SPM, SO2,a n dN O x. Hilton and Levinson (1998)
estimate the relationship between lead emissions and income. They ﬁnd an inverted U-shape
pollution-income relationship with a turning point that is sensitive to both functional form
(polynomial and log-quadratic) and time period (pre and post 1983). For post 1983, they ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant peak. Table 4 gives the turning points for all studies in constant US
dollars.4
In a more recent study, Stern and Common (2001) ask whether the basic econometric model
is adequately speciﬁed; i.e., whether the model is subject to omitted variables bias. They
use a larger and more globally representative SO2 sample (31 annual observations on each
of 73 developed and developing countries) than previous SO2 EKC studies. They estimate a
logarithmic quadratic pollution-income curve for world, OECD and non-OECD samples. They
ﬁnd that the turning point for SO2 depends on the sample employed; for the OECD countries,
4All dollar ﬁgures in this paper are in year 2000 constant US dollars.
4$11,250, and for the world, $123,188.
Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson (2002) also question the speciﬁcation of the basic econo-
metric model. They update and clean up the data employed by Grossman and Krueger (1995);
i.e., their results beneﬁt from 10 years of additional observations, more cities, and revisions of
some of the original observations. In addition, the authors test the sensitivity of the pollution-
income relationship to alternative functional forms, additional covariates and changes in the
nations, cities and years sampled. They include variables describing national income, political
structure, investment, trade and population density, as well as control variables that account
for location of monitoring stations. They ﬁnd the results to be highly sensitive to these changes
and conclude that the jury is still out on whether suﬃcient empirical support exists for an
inverted U-shaped relationship. By adding 10 years and 25 cities to Grossman and Krueger’s
data set, Harbaugh et. al. ﬁnd SO2 emissions peak at $29,587. Depending on the length of
the GDP time-lag, explanatory variables, year dummies, structural form, and outlier removal,
estimated SO2 peaks range from $27,700 to $96,507. When the authors limit their SO2 sample
to countries with income greater than $11,787, they ﬁnd no evidence of the inverted U-shape.
They also conduct the same types of regressions for airborne lead and NOx.A c c o r d i n gt oH a r -
baugh, et. al., due to smaller sample sizes the results are generally less statistically signiﬁcant.
Yet, NOx appears to peak at $7,956 and airborne lead at $21,070.
Citing the data availability and accuracy problems with GEMS data, List and Gallet (1999)
and Millimet, List, and Stengos (2003) use utilize pooled U.S. state-level data from EPA
(2000b).5 List and Gallet (1999) use quadratic and cubic speciﬁcations popular in previous
EKC studies, as well as a semiparametric model that allows for state-level EKC heterogeneity.
For parametric models, they estimate NOx peak emissions at incomes from $13,071 to $16,275,
5A problem with this data is that the EPA changed its state level measurement methods in 1985, so
emissions estimations fall into two major regimes: 1929-1984 and 1985-1994. Emissions estimates in the ﬁrst
regime are derived from the top down; information at the national level is used to derive individual U.S. states’
emissions. In 1985, the EPA began to measure emissions at the plant or county level, aggregating these totals
to form state-level emissions.
5and for semiparametric models, incomes from $19,224 to $26,541. For SO2,t h e ye s t i m a t e
peak emissions at incomes from $30,408 to $34,055 (parametric) and at $19,920 to $29,415
(semiparametric). Millimet, List, and Stengos (2003) test the traditional parametric regression
(quadratic and cubic speciﬁcations) against a more ﬂexible semiparametric approach. Millimet,
et. al., using a parametric cubic speciﬁcation, estimate peak NOx emissions at $13,072 for the
full data set and $15,961 for the 1985-94 data. For SO2, they ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant
results for the full data set and a peak at $24,790 for the 1985-94 data set. Utilizing the
semiparametric approach, they ﬁnd peaks at $18,120 (NOx) and $12,080 (SO2). They also
test the validity of the parametric speciﬁcation and determine they can statistically reject
parametric models in favor of the semiparametric approach. Speciﬁcally, they note that the
estimated parametric peak for SO2 is very sensitive to modeling assumptions.
Figure 1 plots the U.S. time series pollution data. We use U.S. national emissions data
from 1947-1998 from EPA (2000b). We aggregate CO and NOx emissions since the cost data
is not disaggregated between these two pollutants. Unfortunately, collection methods change
over time as new sources of emissions are added. To resolve this problem, we assume that
if a new source is added in period t, the change in emissions for that source from t − 1 to t
equals the average change from all other sources. We can then estimate emissions in period
t − 1 and so on back to the initial year.6 For all pollutants except particulates, new sources
are relatively small. Thus, the results are not sensitive to how and if we modify the data to
deal with new sources. All pollutants show some evidence of an inverted-U shape over time,
although particulates and lead are mostly decreasing. When emissions are plotted against per
capita income, lead is even less clearly inverted-U shaped.
Table 4 gives the level of per-capita income at which pollution peaks. The income data
comes from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the U.S. Department of
6Other ideas are less attractive. Excluding new sources would introduce a downward bias on national
emissions and bias some parameters (for example, lower national emissions would cause an upward bias in the
parameter which measures preferences for environmental quality).
6Commerce. As detailed in Section 5.1 below, changes to income data were made so that the
data is consistent with the theoretical model developed below. Table 4 shows that emissions
peaked late in development for the U.S., ranging from an income of $20,983 per capita for
particulates to $35,091 for SO2. As seen in Table 4, these values are more consistent with the
later empirical literature, which predicts emissions peak at a relatively high income. These
results are also broadly consistent with Brock and Taylor (2003), who note pollution in the
U.S. peaks in the 1970s for most pollutants.7 The peaks are somewhat higher than U.S. state
level studies, but as Selden and Song (1994) note, the emissions peak using national data
tends to be higher than the emissions peak using more disaggregated data. In addition, our
modiﬁcations to the GNP data include adding imputed services from government capital and
durable goods, which increases GNP by as much as 18%. Table 4 shows that all categories
except particulates peaked between 1970 and 1973. Particulates peaked in 1950. Therefore,
we conclude that the stylized fact in the U.S. data is that the pollution-income curve has an
inverted U-shape, and that emissions peak at a relatively late stage of development.
3 Development and the Environment: Theory
As the theory goes, in the ﬁrst stage of industrialization, people are more interested in eating
than in breathing clean air. Communities are too poor to pay for abatement and environmental
regulation is correspondingly weak or non-existent. As income rises, industry becomes cleaner
and marginal utility of consumption falls, indicating that people value the environment more
highly. Also, regulatory institutions become more eﬀective. Along the curve, pollution levels
oﬀ in the middle-income range and then falls toward pre-industrial levels in wealthy societies.
Thus, according to Dasputa, et. al. (2002), certain assumptions must be made to achieve
the inverted U-shape. Namely, with an increase in income, there must be constant or falling
marginal utility of consumption, rising disutility of pollution or rising marginal damage of
7The results are also broadly consistent with Portney (1990). Further, Deacon and Norman (2004) show
that SO2 was decreasing since the 1970s for a variety of wealthy countries.
7pollution (environmental quality is a normal good), and increasing marginal cost of abatement.
Also, public agencies must exist that regulate pollution with full information about the beneﬁts
and costs of pollution control. Pollution may be reduced by abatement activity or by an
increasingly “cleaner” composition of GDP and consumption. Dinda (2004) divides the large
number of theoretical explanations into ﬁve broad categories. Here we review only three
categories and formally test one (in Section 8 we discuss how the other two explanations could
be tested).
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) and Kelly (2003) focus on the cost of abatement. According
to Kelly (2003), simple convexity in costs of abatement are suﬃcient for the marginal cost of
abatement to rise along the growth path. By modeling environmental quality as a normal good,
marginal damages rise with income. The trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects determines the
shape of the pollution-income curve. Andreoni and Levinson (2001) suppose that abatement
has increasing returns to scale. They show that after the economy achieves a certain minimum
size, it is worthwhile to pay the initial or ﬁxed costs and begin abatement.
Cropper and Griﬃths (1994), Jones and Manuelli (2001) and others focus on institutional
explanations. Countries with strong property rights and institutions typically are more wealthy
and are better able to regulate emissions. Hence, a panel of countries with varying degrees
of institutional strength could produce an inverted U-shape: pollution increases with growth
among poor countries with weak institutions and decreases with growth in wealthy countries
with strong institutions.
Stokey (1998) and John and Pecchenino (1994) provide models with pollution-income
curves that are inverted U-shaped, peaking when the optimum switches from a corner so-
lution with zero abatement to an interior optimum with positive environmental investment.
John and Pecchenino (1994) use an overlapping-generations framework in which environmen-
tal quality is a stock resource. While consumption degrades the environment, investment in
the environment by the younger generation improves the environment bequeathed to future
8generations. In Stokey (1998), pollution is proportional to GDP, but the proportion can be
reduced by a control technology. A “dirty” method of production is used if income is below
a critical threshold, while progressively cleaner methods are utilized as income rises above
that level. Below the threshold, pollution increases with income. Above the threshold, to-
tal pollution depends on the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption goods. For an
elasticity greater than one, the model has an inverted-U pollution-income curve. An increase
in income raises consumption, which reduces the marginal utility of consumption. Therefore,
the marginal beneﬁt of emissions (increased consumption via increased GDP) falls. Further,
pollution is proportional to income and utility is convex in pollution, so an increase in income
raises the marginal damage of pollution.
4M o d e l
The model is a generalization of Kelly (2003), which allows for exogenous labor-augmenting
and pollution-reducing technological change. The model does not have increasing returns
to abatement, and implicitly assumes institutions exist which can regulate pollution. The
model does have a constraint that abatement is non-negative. Thus we will test whether the
non-negativity constraint idea explains the shape and the timing of the pollution-income curve
in the U.S. data.
The population of Lt identical households have preferences over end-of-the-period envi-
ronmental quality Nt+1, consumption Ct
Lt, and leisure equal to one less hours worked ht in













+( 1− α)log(Nt+1) − γht. (1)
We use the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor assumption, which implies linear aggregate disu-
tility of labor. A particular issue is the assumption that utility is separable in consumption,
leisure and environmental quality. Strong complementarity between consumption and envi-
9ronmental quality would tend to make environmental quality more appealing at high incomes,
when consumption and leisure are highest, and less appealing at low incomes.8
A constant returns to scale technology exists that produces GDP Qt from capital Kt and
productivity-augmented total hours htLtAt.H e r e At is the level of technology, which grows





Unabated pollution is an exogenous proportion 1
Bt of GDP. Let ut denote the fraction of
emissions abated, then 1−ut
Bt is the emissions intensity of GDP and emissions, Et,i s :




The cost of emissions abatement is C (ut)Qt. Hence GDP net of abatement costs, Yt,i s :
Yt =( 1− C (ut))Qt. (4)
We assume a convex cost function:
C (ut)=1− (1 − ut)
ε . (5)
Using Equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) to substitute out for Qt and ut implies GDP net of
abatement costs is Cobb-Douglas:





Here θ = ψ(1 − ε) is the capital share and ε can thus be interpreted as the emissions share.
We assume emissions, Et, is stationary. Therefore, the exogenous growth rate of Bt must
equal the growth rate of GDP, η + φ(1 + η). Exogenous growth of Bt is assumed to capture
technological change in abatement and compositional changes in GDP.
8Given that utility is separable, the pollution-income curve is not very sensitive to labor supply. We have
endogenous labor supply in the model to make the calibration easier.
10Let capital depreciate at rate δk. The resource constraint then sets consumption plus net
investment equal to production net of abatement costs:
Ct = Yt +( 1− δk)Kt − Kt+1. (6)
Environmental quality is a decreasing function of the stock of pollution, Mt+1:
Nt+1 = c M − Mt+1. (7)
Here c M is the maximum sustainable pollution stock. We assume the pollution concentration
decays at a constant rate δm. Therefore the stock of pollution accumulates according to:
Mt+1 = Et +( 1− δm)Mt. (8)
The objective function of the social planner is to maximize lifetime utility of all households:















The problem can be normalized with economic variables written in per productivity unit
terms. Let the units of emissions be such that A0L0 = B0, let kt = Kt
LtAt and similarly for ct
and yt and let ˆ β = β (1 + η) < 1. Then the social planning problem is:
v =m a x





[U (ct,N t+1,h t)], (10)
subject to:
ct = F (kt,E t,h t)+( 1− δk)kt − (1 + η)(1+φ)kt+1 (11)
Nt+1 = c M − Mt+1 (12)
Mt+1 = Et +( 1− δm)Mt. (13)
In addition, maximum and minimum emissions exist corresponding to u =0and u =1 :














t and the non-negativity constraint on abatement given by Equation (14) is binding.
The recursive version of the problem is:















The maximization is subject to (13) and (14).
5 Calibration
5.1 Data
In contrast to the panel studies, we focus solely on U.S. data. Since we want an “out-of-
sample” test of the EKC theory, we exclude developing countries as we don’t calibrate to the
observed pollution-income curve. The economic data, gleaned from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Federal Reserve, and Bureau of Labor Statistics, is standard. All sources are in the
References Section. A number of manipulations were made to make these data consistent with
the model. For example, durable goods “consumption” is actually consistent with investment
in the model, and the stock of inventories is consistent with the model’s deﬁnition of capital.
These modiﬁcations are standard in the literature (see for example Cooley and Prescott, 1995)
and are fully described in Bartz (2006). Emissions data is described in Section 2.
To calibrate the environmental parameters, we require data on emissions, compliance costs
and control rates. Our environmental cost and control rate data is harvested from EPA (1990).
This report is attractive for our purpose as the authors divide compliance spending by pollutant
category. The categories include: (1) particulates, (2) SO2,( 3 )N O x and CO, (4) lead, and
(5) VOCs.
Compliance cost data exists for years 1972-1998; however, no reports are available after
1990, so compliance costs for 1991-1998 are from EPA projections. The EPA reports both
capital and ﬂow cost data, but our model has only ﬂow costs. To convert capital costs into
12ﬂows, we assume stationary and mobile capital (e.g. cars) are amortized over lives of 20 years
and 10 years, respectively. We are implicitly assuming no capital compliance costs occurred
prior to 1972. The interest rate used for the amortization is identical to the steady state
interest rate derived from the economic data, around 8%. The amortization is in accordance
with EPA methods, except they use a 7% interest rate. Full details are available in Bartz
(2006).
Table 10.2 of EPA (1990) gives control rate data for the period 1984-1988. We also calibrate
using SO2 permit price data, gleaned from EPA (2000a). Finally, atmospheric depreciation
rates are from air pollution textbooks (Stern, 1976; Stern, Boubel, Turner, and Fox, 1984).
5.2 Assignment of Model Parameters
Most of the economic parameters are calibrated in an identical manner to the previous liter-
ature (see for example Cooley and Prescott, 1995). In general, we choose the parameters to
match certain long run average features of the data. We do not use the observed dynamic
relationship between emissions and income in the data to calibrate any of the parameters,
since we are testing this aspect of the model.
We calibrate the rate of growth in population so that the rate of growth in population in
the model economy matches the average rate of growth in population in the data over the
sample period. Similarly, the rate of growth of technology is chosen so that the steady state
rate of growth in per capita GDP, gy, in the model economy matches the average rate of growth
in per capita GDP in the data. We deﬁne investment, X,a s :
Xt = Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt.
Since in the steady state investment, GDP, and capital all grow at the same rate, the steady




=( 1+η)(1+φ) − (1 − δk). (15)




β b et h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e . T h eﬁrst order condition for optimal
investment at the steady state is then:
[(1 + ρ)(1+φ) − (1 − δk)]k = θy. (16)
Equation (16) implies θ is the share of income accruing to capital owners since the left hand
s i d ei st h er e t u r no nc a p i t a l .L e tIt denote capital income, then we choose θ = I
Y , so that the
share of income accruing to capital owners in the model matches the average share of income
accruing to capital owners in the data.9 Then using (16), ρ is chosen so that the steady state
capital to GDP net of abatement costs ratio in the model economy matches the data. We thus
assign the parameters ρ, φ, η, δk,a n dθ using the standard technique of Cooley and Prescott
(1995). Table 1 gives the calibrated values of the economic parameters.10
We use scientiﬁc studies to calculate the rate of decay of the stock of pollution, δm.W e
classify pollutants that survive in the atmosphere for less than a year as ﬂows (δm =1 ).
Particulates, SO2,N O x, lead and VOCs all last in the atmosphere for less than a week. CO
has an atmospheric residence time of one to three months. One type of VOC, hydrocarbons,
has a residence time of 16 years. Since we cannot separate the spending on hydrocarbons from
other VOCs, we use an average residence time of eight years.11 Table 3 gives the calibrated
values of δm.
We explore three alternatives for the calibration of the emissions share, ε. Ideally, the
emissions share may be computed using observed tax rates or permit prices if the government
9The capital share depends on y, output net of compliance spending, rather than total output, q.S i n c e y
is pollutant speciﬁc, the capital share is pollutant speciﬁc. This is an artifact of running the model separately
for each pollutant, rather than considering all pollutants together, an assumption we make for computational
simplicity. In practice, because compliance spending is a small fraction of GDP, the capital share and most
other economic parameters are nearly identical across pollutants.
10Diﬀerences between Table 1 and Cooley and Prescott (1995) arise due to NIPA data revisions and because
we use a diﬀerent time period.
11EPA (2000b) estimate 43-50% of VOC emissions are hydrocarbons.
14uses a market-based regulation instrument. The planning problem of Section 4 can be de-
centralized into a competitive equilibrium in which the marginal product of emissions equals
t h et a xr a t ep e ru n i to fe m i s s i o n s( o rt h ep r i c eo fat r a d a b l ep e r m i tt h a ta l l o w so n eu n i to f









H e n c ew ec h o o s eε so that the share of income spent on emissions taxes (or permits) equals
the average share of income spent on permits or taxes in the data. It is important to note we
only use data from a developed economy at the steady state to calculate ε. In the transitional
dynamics, changes in the marginal product of emissions as a country develops are important
for the shape of the pollution-income curve (see Kelly, 2003). However, we reiterate that our
calibration only utilizes GDP data from a fully developed economy, so ε is not chosen to match
the peak of the pollution-income curve in any way.
Unfortunately among the pollutants in the data only SO2 regulation is market-based. For
the remaining pollutants (and SO2, for comparison) we use EPA environmental compliance
cost data to calibrate the emissions share. From Equation (5):
ε =
log(1 − C (ut))
log(1 − ut)
. (19)
We thus set ε so that the elasticity governing the sensitivity of compliance costs to the control
rate matches the average elasticity in the data. Unfortunately, the EPA provides control rate
data only for the period 1984-1988, so this method of calibration relies on a small data set.
A third method involves combining Equations (3) and (5):
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Q











Note that since B grows at the same rate as GDP and emissions is stationary, BE/Q is
stationary. Given the ratio BE/Q,w es e tε so that long run average environmental compliance
spending in the model matches long run average compliance cost spending in the data.
We have then three calibration strategies, each with some advantages and disadvantages.
Choosing ε to match spending on pollution permits has the advantage of relying on higher-
quality market data. However, permit data is available only for SO2. Calibrating ε to match
compliance spending requires construction of an estimate of exogenous improvements emissions
intensity, which is highly variable. Calibrating ε to match control rate data does not require
information on emissions intensity improvements, but data is available only for ﬁve years. All
methods yield reasonably similar results (see Table 3). Section 7 shows that a large change in
ε is needed to aﬀect the results, so for the remainder of the paper we employ the control rate
calibration.
An example may help the reader understand the calibration. Consider that in 1986 lead
emissions dropped from 22.9 to 7.3 million short tons. In that year, compliance spending was
nearly unchanged at 0.007% of GDP, and the control rate increased from 91% to 96%. Using
the second method, the 1986 observation indicates almost all lead emissions were controlled
at little cost, and therefore the technology for controlling lead emissions appears very eﬃcient,
and thus ε is small. Given that lead emissions fell dramatically without any increase in costs, it
is clear that the exogenous part of emissions intensity 1/B1996 fell dramatically. However, the
model assumes a constant rate of growth in exogenous emissions intensity. Given an average
improvement in emissions intensity and a large decline in emissions, the denominator in (20)
falls and ε needs to be larger to match the 1986 cost data.12 Thus in 1986 the cost strategy
12That regulations changed is not relevant, since ε measures only technological cost of reducing emissions.
16overestimates ε because it does not account for the unusual fall in emissions intensity. Relying
on the control rate data avoids this problem, but, again, that data is only available for ﬁve
years.
Let subscripts on functions denote derivatives. The ﬁrst order condition for optimal emis-
sions at the steady state is:
((1 + ρ) − (1 + η)(1+δm))Uc(c, c M − M,h)fE(k,E,h)=UN(c, c M − M,h)(1+ρ).
Hence:





c M − M
(1 − α). (21)
Equation (21) equates the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of emissions at the steady
state. We therefore set α so that steady state emissions in the model matches long run
average emissions in the data.
The ﬁrst order condition for optimal hours worked at the steady state is:





α(1 − θ − ε)
h
. (22)
Given the consumption to GDP net of abatement costs ratio implied by the model, we calibrate
γ so that the steady state fraction of time spent working in the model matches the data, which
is h =0 .20.13
It is typical to assume the U.S. economy is ﬂuctuating around a deterministic steady
state. Hence, the steady state can be taken as the long run average of U.S. data. Since
the model generates a stationary level of emissions, we expect that in the data emissions
13McGrattan (1994) ﬁnds h =0 .27. Our methodology is similar except that we use the establishment
survey, which reports lower hours (and thus higher productivity) than the household survey, especially in the
1990s.
17are also ﬂuctuating around a steady state. Emissions of most pollutants, however, are either
trending downward or have been stationary only recently. Therefore, we must choose a
suitable time period during which emissions of each pollutant is stationary. Particulates have
been roughly constant since 1980 and lead since 1986. Thus we use 1980-1998 and 1986-1998
data to calculate the stationary level of emissions and abatement costs for particulates and
lead, respectively. However, SO2,N O x/CO, and VOCs have only leveled oﬀ recently, if at all.
SO2 and NOx/CO are roughly constant over the period 1995-1998, while VOCs are roughly
constant over the period of 1996-1998. For all pollutants, a time series forecast indicates
a steady state very close to current levels. We therefore use 1995-1998 data to calculate
the stationary level of emissions and abatement costs for SO2 and NOx/CO and 1996-1998
data for VOCs.14 The model then implicitly assumes the U.S. is transitioning to a balanced
growth path over the period 1952 to the stationary period with k, y, and abatement spending
increasing and E decreasing. This matches the data, with k and y increasing 10-20% over
the transition period.15
We have thus chosen nine parameters to match various features of the U.S. economy. Five
economic parameters depend only on the environmental data in that y diﬀers from q,w h i c h
makes no diﬀerence up to two signiﬁcant digits. One parameter is chosen from scientiﬁc studies.
The remaining three parameters are derived using only data from a developed economy (1980
and after) and are in fact chosen to match the hours, emissions, and environmental compliance
spending data of the recent U.S. economy. An interesting question is the prediction of the
model for transition economies, which we turn to next.
14Writing a model for which emissions are decreasing along the balanced growth path poses theoretical
problems. In particular, such a model requires exogenous emissions intensity to fall faster than exogenous
labor productivity rises. Thus, emissions saving technological change would continue at a constant rate,
despite having marginal beneﬁts which approach zero.
15Most of the increase in k and y occur prior to 1980. We therefore use the period 1980-1998 to calculate
the economic ratios.
186R e s u l t s
The model was solved using the method of Kelly and Kolstad (1999), which computes non-
linear approximations of the value function and decision rules E(k,M), k0(k,M),a n dh(k,M).
Per capita income in the empirical literature corresponds to income prior to abatement spend-
ing, q =
Q




ψ ,M).F o rt h eﬂow
pollutant categories (particulates, SO2,N O x/CO, and lead), the decisions are independent
of M; therefore, the pollution-income curve E(q) measures emissions only as a function of
income. E(q) shares a similar shape with E(k) and thus also with the pollution-income curve
generated from time series data starting from a less-developed initial condition (k0 equal to a
small positive number). For the stock pollutant category, VOCs, the eﬀect of an increase in
income on emissions (or the end of the period pollution stock M0) varies with M,s ow er e p o r t
several versions of the pollution-income curve.
The model exhibits increasing and then decreasing levels of emissions for all ﬂow pollutants
as income increases, suggesting an inverted-U relationship (see Figures 2-5). Speciﬁcally, for
suﬃciently low incomes (low capital stocks), our model displays a corner solution. When
income is low, no abatement exists. The planner prefers to set abatement equal to zero in
order to increase GDP and thus increase consumption. Hence, the constraint that emissions
cannot exceed emissions with zero abatement (Equation 14) binds. Then, as the capital stock
increases past a certain level, abatement rises above zero and emissions decline.
For the stock pollutant VOCs, the shape of the pollution-income curve varies according to
how pollution is measured. No matter the value of M, emissions have an inverted U-shape
as a function of income. If we generate a time series starting from a suﬃciently small k0
and M0 and plot emissions as a function of q, the result is again an inverted-U shape (see
F i g u r e6 ) .H o w e v e r ,i fw eu s et h es a m et i m es e r i e s ,b u tp l o tM as a function of q,t h e nt h e
pollution-income curve is increasing. The current stock of pollution is a function of all previous
19emissions decisions and thus all previous incomes. Therefore, the stock will tend increase with
income even if emissions are a decreasing or inverted-U function of current income.16
Analytically, for ﬂow pollutants, the optimal emissions are determined from the trade-
oﬀ between the marginal beneﬁt of emissions, equal to the marginal product of emissions
times the marginal utility of consumption, and the marginal cost of emissions, equal to the
marginal utility of environmental quality. For our calibrated values, the marginal utility
of consumption falls with income whereas the marginal utility of environmental quality is
relatively constant. Hence the unconstrained pollution-income curve is decreasing. Further,
the emissions constraint is concave in capital. Together, these facts imply that the pollution-
income curve will be inverted U-shaped and the constraint that emissions cannot be negative
will be binding for suﬃciently low incomes (see Figure 7). Indeed, we prove this theoretically in
A p p e n d i xB .F o rt h es t o c kp o l l u t a n tV O C s ,i tt u r n so u tt h a te m i s s i o n sc o n t i n u et oi n c r e a s ef o r
a short income interval after the constraint is no longer binding (the slope of the unconstrained
pollution-income curve becomes less than the slope of the constraint, but still is positive).
Emissions then decline once income exceeds this interval. Thus the nature of the cost function,
rather than the non-negative abatement constraint, explains the inverted-U shape for VOCs.17
Although we garner an inverted U-shape, the downward turn occurs very early in develop-
ment. Table 4 shows that the peak emissions occur between 10 and 13 percent of the steady
state capital stock, whereas in the data the peak occurs between 77 and 90 percent of the
steady state capital stock. Why does the model predict emissions peak so early in develop-
ment? In the steady state U.S. economy, compliance spending is small relative to GDP. Steady
state abatement for all pollutants is 70-74% of uncontrolled emissions. Yet, steady state com-
pliance spending is well under 1% of GDP for each pollutant. Therefore the calibration chooses
as m a l lε to reﬂect that abatement is relatively inexpensive in the data. But if pollution is
16Kelly (2003) show this result is a possibility in numerical examples.
17Kelly (2003) shows the non-negativity constraint is not necessary for an inverted-U in a simpler version of
this model.
20inexpensive to abate, then countries can aﬀord to abate at a relatively low income. Indeed, it
is apparent from the calibration that the puzzle in the data is why the U.S. waited until 1970
to begin signiﬁcant abatement, given that abatement is so inexpensive. This is most striking
for lead emissions. The U.S. reduced lead emissions from 255 million short tons in 1972 to 4.5
million short tons in 1992, but compliance spending rose from essentially zero to only 0.015%
of GDP. Given that lead emissions could be reduced so inexpensively, why was compliance
spending still essentially zero in 1972, when the U.S. GDP per capita was $32,396?
Emissions would also peak later in development if the parameter governing household
preferences for environmental quality, 1 − α, were lower. However, the calibration requires
households have some preference for environmental quality, otherwise emissions would decline
little and end up at a higher steady state than observed in the U.S. data.
Alternative parameter values exist that can generate an emissions peak identical to the data
(see Section 7), but these parameter values are unrealistic. They imply emissions reduction
is more costly or that households have weaker preferences for environmental quality than is
apparent in the U.S. data.
Turning now to the empirical studies, our U.S. data is more consistent with the later
empirical studies, which predict emissions peak at a relatively high income, if at all. According
to our model, emissions peak early in development, which is more consistent with the earlier
empirical studies that predict emissions peak for middle income countries. Still, comparisons
are diﬃcult because the literature focuses on GDP per capita as the state variable rather than
GDP per productivity unit, which is the state variable of our model. If the data is cross
sectional and all countries have the same technology, then our model maps one-to-one into the
empirical literature by simply multiplying GDP per productivity unit by At.H o w e v e r ,m o s t
empirical studies use panel data, so two data points with nearly the same income per capita
but diﬀerent years could represent signiﬁcantly diﬀerent places on the transition path.
Our results provide some guidance to the empirical literature. Our state variable is GDP
21per productivity unit rather than GDP per capita. In the empirical literature, the regression
is of the form:




Thus the time trend may pick up a mixture of time-related eﬀects: productivity advances,
compositional changes, emission eﬃciency innovations, and any structural breaks that may
have occurred (e.g. a shift in preferences in the 1970s). In contrast, our model allows only






















Figures 2-6 show the results of estimating a quadratic version of Equation (24).18 Thus, the
theory in this paper points toward using income per productivity unit without a time trend
as a regressor in reduced form regressions.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
Here we perform sensitivity analysis to check robustness of the results and to gain information
about what parameters most aﬀect the peak emissions. Each row of Table 5 is a simulation
that holds all parameters constant at the values determined by the particulates calibration
except for the given parameter. The critical value is the value of the given parameter that
results in an emissions peak equal to the emissions peak in the U.S. data, about 77.25% of
the steady state capital stock for particulates. Most of the parameters have little eﬀect on
the emissions peak. The consumption share α and emissions share ε are clearly the most
18The quadratic term is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level for all pollutants.
22important parameters, since these aﬀect the central trade-oﬀ between environmental quality
and consumption. A higher α means the marginal utility of consumption is higher, and
thus optimal unconstrained emissions rise across the development path. Higher unconstrained
emissions in turn implies that the abatement non-negativity constraint becomes non-binding
at a later stage of development (a larger k). Graphically, this corresponds to a shift to the
right of the optimal emissions curve in Figure 7. A higher ε means the marginal product of
emissions is greater, increasing the incentive to emit regardless of development and causing
the unconstrained optimal emissions curve to shift to the right. However, it is important to
note that increasing α and ε also cause steady state emissions to rise. If we change α or ε so
that the model predicts an emissions peak of 77.25% of the steady state capital stock, then
the model predicts steady state emissions that are about three times the levels observed in the
U.S. data.
The most important economic parameter is γ. Increasing preferences for leisure (increas-
ing γ) decreases hours and thus income. Lowering income increases the marginal utility of
consumption, which in turn increases incentives to emit and hence causes emissions to peak
later. Decreasing hours also tightens the constraint that requires abatement to be positive (see
Equation 14). This also causes emissions to peak later. However, to get emissions to peak as
in the U.S. data requires increasing γ to a point such that steady state hours are 27% below
that in the U.S. data.
Increasing δk, η,a n dφ lower income per-productivity unit available for consumption and
abatement. The marginal utility of consumption thus falls and optimal emissions rise, which
causes emissions to peak later. Increasing ρ reduces investment, freeing up income to be
spent on consumption and abatement. This causes optimal emissions to fall and emissions to
peak earlier. However, reducing investment also reduces the steady state capital stock. Thus
emissions peak at a lower capital stock, but at a higher percentage of the steady state capital
stock for ρ.I n c r e a s i n gθ also reduces investment, but the trade-oﬀ between the reduction in
23steady state capital stock and the earlier absolute peak in emissions is non linear.
Table 5 shows that economic parameter values exist for which the model replicates the U.S.
emissions experience, where emissions peaked late in development. However, these parameter
values are unrealistic: they are contrary to intuition and imply the model will not perform
well in a variety of other standard dimensions.
To examine interaction eﬀects among the parameters, we randomly select a sample of
parameter vectors from an assumed distribution, solve the model for each parameter vector,
and calculate the emissions peak. We then compute statistics from the resulting emissions
peak data. To keep the computations manageable, we allow only the two parameters that
are most uncertain and most strongly aﬀect the emissions peak, α and ε, to vary. We assign
a very conservative distribution for each parameter. We assume α and ε are such that the
lower bound is the baseline value and the upper bound is the value that results in steady state
emissions that are twice that of the U.S. data when all other parameters are held at their
















We ran 100 simulations, the results of which are summarized in Table 6. We reject the
hypothesis that the emissions peak is greater than or equal to 50% of the steady state capital
stock given the assumed parameter uncertainty with 95% conﬁdence. We therefore conclude
that the results of the model are robust to reasonable parameter uncertainty.
8 Conclusions/Implications
Our results show increasing and then decreasing pollution emissions as income rises. At ﬁrst,
abatement is equal to zero. People are more interested in eating than environmental quality.
Then, preferences for environmental quality come into play and the abatement constraint
ceases to bind. Indeed, if we remove the requirement that abatement must be non-negative,
we ﬁnd a decidedly negative relationship between income and emissions.
24The fact that abatement is initially equal to zero (a corner solution) is in accord with Stokey
(1998) and others. However, the model predicts that emissions peak early in development,
largely because abatement is inexpensive relative to GDP, according to U.S. emissions and
compliance spending data. Thus the results imply an interesting puzzle: why did the U.S.
wait until the 1950s to begin signiﬁcant abatement for particulates and until the 1970s for all
other pollutants?
Although we test only one theoretical explanation, the corner solution, other standard
theories are not likely to fare better. Consider the institutional explanation of Jones and
Manuelli (1995). The U.S. clearly had many functioning institutions common to developed
countries prior to 1970 (justice system, etc.). Why did the EPA not arise until 1970? Or
consider the theory of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) that increasing returns to abatement
exist. Since total compliance costs, including ﬁxed costs, are small, why the U.S. require such
a high income to make it optimal to pay the ﬁxed costs and begin abatement?
Less standard explanations may hold some promise. Adding uncertainty either over the
cost of abatement or the damage from pollution could explain some of the delays. Similarly,
as i g n i ﬁcant technological innovation could have reduced the cost of abatement in the 1970s.
Or perhaps a shift in preferences for environmental quality in the 1970s caused the observed
increase in abatement. These ideas are more diﬃcult to test, however, and also do not neces-
sarily imply an inverted-U shape pollution-income curve.19 Finally, the peak could be linked
to increases in the price of energy during the 1970s.
Another possibility is that the corner solution is the correct idea, but some modiﬁcations
of the model are needed. For example, the functional form of the cost or utility functions
could be incorrect. The modiﬁed cost or utility function would have to raise emissions only for
low and middle income stages of development, however. Also, our model assumes emissions
19Deacon and Norman (2004) look at time series data for a variety of countries and ﬁnd a similar empirical
result to ours for the U.S. They speculate that the downward trend in emissions since the 1970s may be a
result of a shift in preferences, but note that other explanations may be observationally equivalent.
25are stationary. Given the decrease in emissions over the past twenty years even in developed
countries, perhaps a better choice is to assume the rate of decline in emissions intensity is
larger than the growth rate of GDP. However, this implies that research and development
which increases the productivity of emissions would continue despite returns to innovation
that are much lower than the returns to innovations that increase the productivity of labor.
Empirical work of late has called into question whether the relationship between growth and
pollution is a simple inverted-U. Our results show that existing theory may need substantial
modiﬁcations to explain the U.S. experience with growth and pollution. The relationship
between economic growth and the environment is apparently considerably more complicated
than once thought. Nonetheless, the eﬀect of economic growth on the environment is an
important problem and is therefore deserving of continued research.
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T a b l e1 :E c o n o m i cp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .S m a l ld i ﬀerences (less than 0.001 for φ, less than 0.0001
for all other economic paramters) exist in the economic parameters across pollutants.
Particulates SO2 NOx/CO Lead VOCs
Emissions 0.0434 0.0194 0.1179 0.0052 0.0199
Compliance Spending 0.151 0.1812 0.0221 0.0154 0.0622
Abatement 66.34 29.61 68.76 99.87 39.62
Steady State Period 1980-1998 1995-1998 1995-1998 1986-1998 1996-1998
Table 2: Average yearly emissions (short gigatons), compliance spending (% of GDP), and
abatement (% of unabated emissions) in steady state time period.
Control Rate Calibration
Parameter ε α γ δm
PM 0.00139 0.924 3.640 1
SO2 0.00516 0.756 2.960 1
NOx /C O 0.00019 0.989 3.905 1
Pb 0.00002 0.998 3.945 1
VOCs 0.00123 0.894 3.525 0.125
Cost Calibration
PM 0.00091 0.949 3.741 1
SO2 0.00145 0.918 3.615 1
NOx /CO 0.00017 0.989 3.908 1
Pb 0.00015 0.990 3.911 1
VOCs 0.00046 0.958 3.780 0.125
Permit Calibration
SO2 0.00033 0.980 3.867 1
Table 3: Environmental Parameter values.
31Pollutant
Empirical Studies PM SO2 NOx/CO Pb VOCs
GK $9,011 $5,967
SS $15,221 $12,786 $8,767-$16,560
SC $123,188
HL $12,420




Our Data (US$) $20,983 $35,091 $34,296 $34,296 $32,396
Our Data (% k) 77.25% 90.22% 86.75% 83.53% 83.53%
Our Results 12.6% 12.7% 12.5% 10.0% 15.5%
Table 4: Emissions peaks for selected empirical studies, for our U.S. data, and for our model.
All dollar values are in constant year 2000 dollars. Empirical studies are GK, Grossman and
Krueger (1995), SS, Selden and Song (1994), SC, Stern and Common (2001), HL, Hilton
and Levinson (1998), LG, List and Gallet (1999) and MLS, Millimet, et. al. (2003) HLW,
Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson (2002). Our U.S. GNP data is modiﬁed by adding imputed
services from government capital and durable goods. The percentages are capital levels at
which emissions peak divided by the steady state capital, ¯ k.
Parameter Base Value Critical Value Error E-peak(parameter)
ε 0.00139 0.004 E: +302% increasing
α 0.924 0.974 E: +300% increasing
γ 3.640 9.392 h:- 2 7 . 2 % decreasing
ρ 0.071 0.753 r: +867% increasing
θ 0.402 none inverted-U
δk 0.046 0.144 X/K:+ 2 2 8 increasing
η 0.011 none increasing
φ 0.018 0.109 gy: +589% increasing
Table 5: The critical value is the parameter value where emissions peak at 77.25 percent of the
steady state capital stock. The error is the diﬀerence between the model steady state value
and the average of steady state U.S. data which the parameter was calibrated to. The last







minimum 17.6% 95% Conﬁdence Interval
Hypothesis Result lower bound (%) upper bound (%)
peak=7 7 .25 reject 44.4 52.1
peak ≥ 50 reject −∞ 49.2
Table 6: Statistics are from a data set of emissions peaks as a percentage of the steady state
capital stock.
Appendix B: Theoretical Pollution-Income Relationship
In this appendix, we show theoretically that, for the ﬂow case, unconstrained emissions are
decreasing in the capital stock, and hence that unconstrained pollution decreases as a country
develops. We then establish how the constraint changes with the capital stock to establish the
theoretical pollution-income curve. The results use the supermodularity results of Milgrom
and Shannon (1994).
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Let km and Em denote the maximum sustainable capital and emissions, and let x =[ E,h,s0].
Deﬁne T =[ 0 ,km] as the set of all sustainable capital stocks, and a set Ω as:




Then T is a partially ordered set and Ω is a lattice under the component-wise ordering ≥.
Notice that we are considering the unconstrained problem only and thus do not consider
constraints on maximum and minimum emissions, other than sustainability.
The next step is to show the optimization problem is sub-modular. Milgrom and Shannon
(1994) establish that H is sub modular as a function of {E,h,s0} if and only if the cross partial
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The above inequality holds since consumption is less than income. Hence H is sub modular.
It remains to show that H has decreasing diﬀerences in k. Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
show that H has decreasing diﬀerences if and only if the cross partial derivatives with respect
to the decision variables and k are negative. We have:
Hks0(k,E,h,s
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Since h is a decreasing function of k, the emissions bound may be increasing or decreasing for
ag i v e nk.H o w e v e r , ub(0) = 0 and fh(k,E,0) = ∞implies ub(k) > 0 for k>0.S i n c e t h e
upper bound is a continuous function, it follows that there exists a e k>0 such that ub(k) is
increasing in k over the interval [0,e k].
Unconstrained emissions are decreasing and non-negative, and the upper bound on emis-
sions is increasing for k suﬃciently small and satisﬁes ub(0) = 0. Hence the constrained
optimal pollution-capital curve cannot be strictly decreasing. If unconstrained emissions are
everywhere greater than the upper bound, the pollution-capital curve is increasing. If uncon-
strained emissions drop below the upper bound, then the pollution-capital curve will be an
inverted U-shape with abatement equal to zero over some interval of capital stocks [0,k],a s
in John and Pecchenino (1994) and Stokey (1998). Figure 9 depicts these results for the par-
ticulates case. The upper bound is increasing and concave, and the unconstrained emissions
eventually drop below the upper bound, creating the inverted U-shape.
Appendix C: Figures















































Figure 1: Time series of U.S. national emissions data.
































Figure 2: Predicted and actual pollution-income curve for particulates.


































Figure 3: Predicted and actual pollution-income curve: SO2.































Figure 4: Predicted and actual pollution-income curve: NOx and CO.





























Figure 5: Predicted and actual pollution-income curve: Airborne Lead.




























Figure 6: Predicted and actual pollution-income curve: VOC.






























Figure 7: Predicted Pollution-Income Curve: Unconstrained Particulates.
39